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SHOULD VETERANS DISABILITY COMPENSATION BE
CONDITIONED UPON VETERANS WORKING TOWARDS
REHABILITATION AND RETURN TO EMPLOYMENT
Heather Ansley & Aniela Szymanski *
INTRODUCTION
The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) has experienced dramatic increases in its budgets
since September 11, 2001. 1 Increasing federal deficits during this time has led Congress to seek
spending cuts, causing tensions in efforts to ensure that a declining veteran population receives
the quality benefits and services they earned through years of service. 2

*

Heather Ansley is an advocacy attorney and government relations professional with over a decade of
experience in disability policy. Ansley is the Associate Executive Director of Government Relations at Paralyzed
Veterans of America (PVA). Her responsibilities include managing the organization’s efforts on Capitol Hill and
working with the Administration to promote legislation and policies that ensure veterans with catastrophic
disabilities receive the health care and benefits that they have earned and the civil rights protections that they
deserve. She also works to promote collaboration between disability organizations and veterans service
organizations by serving as an officer on the Consortium for Citizens with Disabilities’ Board of Directors. Before
joining PVA, Ms. Ansley served as Vice President of VetsFirst, a program of United Spinal Association, and as the
Director of Policy and Advocacy for the Lutheran Services in America Disability Network. She also served as a
Research Attorney for the Honorable Steve Leben with the Kansas Court of Appeals. Ms. Ansley holds a BA and
MSW from the University of Missouri-Columbia and a JD from the Washburn University School of Law in Kansas.
Aniela Szymanski is a veterans' law attorney who has served in a variety of capacities in the veterans’ law
community. Ms. Szymanski served as a judge advocate on active duty in the U.S. Marine Corps from 2003 to 2009
before she transferred to the Marine Corps Reserve as a judge advocate and civil affairs officer. Ms. Szymanski
clerked at the U.S. Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims, was an appellate attorney at a veterans law firm, a
Visiting Professor of Practice at William & Mary Law School, Adjunct Professor at University of the District of
Columbia David A. Clark School of Law, and a Director of Government Relations at Military Officers Association
of America focusing on veterans benefits issues. Ms. Szymanski currently serves as Senior Director for Legal
Affairs and Military Policy at Veterans Education Success, advocating for improvements to higher education for
military and veteran-connected students.
1
Christine Scott, Veterans Affairs: Historical Budget Authority FY 1940-FY 2012, CONG. RES. SERV.
REPORT FOR CONG. 4 (2012), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RS22897.pdf.
2
See generally Statutory Pay-As-You-Go Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-139, 124 Stat. 8. (stipulating that
new legislation that changes taxes, fees, or mandatory expenditures must not increase the overall budget, and if a bill
reduces revenues or increases mandatory expenditures, it also must be fully offset by a corresponding increase in
revenues or decrease in spending).
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While the number of veterans in the United States has steadily been declining due to veterans
of World War II, Korea, and Vietnam dying, 3 the number of veterans receiving disability
compensation has risen dramatically due to injuries sustained by service members in conflicts in
Iraq and Afghanistan, and the increased survivability of many of the injuries they have
sustained. 4 The high cost of compensation has prompted policymakers to consider whether
fundamental changes are needed in the VA disability system. Some legislative and policy
recommendations would tie disability benefits to work incentives and medical treatment
requirements to reduce long-term dependence on federal benefits.
Such drastic alterations to the VA benefits system would be inconsistent with the intent that
Congress set forth for the VA in establishing such a disability benefit. Further, such changes may
even be unconstitutional. This article explores the legal and practical aspects of such changes and
argues that conditioning receipt of disability compensation upon either pursuing medical
treatment or return to employment is not a sound course of action. First, the article reviews the
structure of the VA’s disability system, other relevant VA programs, why veterans seek
assistance from the VA, and the cost of those benefits. Next, the article discusses critiques of the
existing system and proposals to change it. Then, the legality of those potential changes is set
forth, including a discussion of whether placing conditions on benefits is constitutional and
practical, historical results of forced treatment schemes, and the permissibility of requiring
employment as a condition of receiving benefits. Finally, the article will explain why imposing
such a job or treatment requirement is not a reasonable solution to the challenges lawmakers seek
to remedy and suggest other means to achieve these ends.
I.

VA’S DISABILITY SYSTEM

It is important to understand the principles upon which veterans’ disability is structured
before considering whether policy changes would be consistent with the original intent of the
benefit.
The veterans’ disability system includes monetary compensation to veterans for disabilities
incurred in or aggravated by military service. 5 These are known as “service-connected
disabilities.” When Congress instituted the system, it directed that the VA “shall adopt and apply
a schedule of ratings of reductions in earning capacity” and that the “ratings shall be based, as far
as practicable, upon the average impairments of earning capacity resulting from such injuries in
civil occupations.” 6
This concept is mirrored in the VA’s regulations at Section 4.1 of Part 38 of the Code of
Federal Regulations (C.F.R.), which states:

3

National Center for Veterans Analysis and Statistics, U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFF.,
https://www.va.gov/vetdata/Veteran_Population.asp (last visited Nov. 2, 2019).
4
CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, VETERANS’ DISABILITY COMP.: TRENDS & POLICY OPTIONS 1 (2014),
http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/attachments/45615-VADisability_1.pdf.
5
38 U.S.C. § 1110 (2018).
6
38 U.S.C. § 1155 (2018).
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The percentage ratings represent as far as can practicably be determined the
average impairment in earning capacity resulting from such diseases and injuries
and their residual conditions in civil occupations. Generally, the degrees of
disability specified are considered adequate to compensate for considerable loss
of working time from exacerbations or illnesses proportionate to the severity of
the several grades of disability.7
The regulations also contain a cautionary note in section 4.10: “It will be remembered that a
person may be too disabled to engage in employment although he or she is up and about and
relatively comfortable at home or upon limited activity.” 8 This implies that the VA should not
consider the loss of nonwork capacity in assigning a rating.
The VA rating schedule is a detailed guideline for each disability. It must contemplate,
however, that veterans will continue to work while receiving disability compensation. According
to the VA’s most recently published data, as of 2017, a majority of veterans receiving VA
disability compensation (1.32 million) received between zero and twenty percent ratings. 9 Only
609,322 veterans out of 4.55 million received a 100 percent rating. 10 Nearly 4 million veterans
receiving compensation in 2017 received less than 100 percent. 11 Veterans receiving less than
100 percent disability are presumed to have a disability that reduces their earning capacity but
which does not eliminate their employability. 12
The VA uses what it terms “generally applicable guidelines” to determine lost earnings
capacity, as opposed to individualized assessments. Generally applicable guidelines merely mean
that the VA assumes that a particular disability has the same impact on earning capacity for
every veteran that suffers from it, instead of assessing individually what that specific disability’s
influence is on each veteran’s earning capacity. To establish such a system, the VA evaluated the
disabling effects of the medical conditions and set forth the results in a rating schedule first
developed in 1945. 13 The results of this were translated into 38 C.F.R., Part IV, Schedule for
Rating Disabilities, rating various medical conditions in ten percent increments. The VA updates
the rating schedule “from time to time,” so it has been updated since 1945, but the principles
remain the same. 14
The schedule is medical in nature and generally focuses on objective factors, such as range of
motion or the presence or absence of symptoms. For example, section 4.71a of 38 C.F.R. sets
criteria for rating disabilities of the musculoskeletal system, with the rating percentages based on
how many degrees a veteran can move their arm, leg, foot, shoulder, or wrist. The schedule does
not consider factors such as whether the veteran is employed or seeking medical treatment to
7

38 C.F.R. § 4.1 (2018).
38 C.F.R. § 4.10 (2018).
9
FY2017 VA Disability Compensation and Pension Recipients by County, U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFF.,
https://catalog.data.gov/dataset/fy2017-compensation-and-pension-recipients-by-county (last visited Nov. 2, 2019).
10
Id.
11
Id.
12
38 C.F.R. § 4.1 (2018).
13
38 C.F.R. § 4.1 (1946).
14
38 U.S.C. § 1155 (2018).
8
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address the disabling condition. 15 The absence of such factors tends to indicate that neither
Congress nor the VA intended these be requirements of the disability scheme for veterans.
A 2012 RAND 16 study evaluated the extent to which a service-related disability impacts the
earnings of active duty service members and reservists and the role government benefits play in
filling earnings gaps. 17 RAND found that retirement and disability payments from the VA and
the U.S. Department of Defense typically “more than fully compensate AC members [active
component service members] with very serious injuries for estimated earnings losses.” 18 Nonreservist veterans with “serious or very serious injuries have [income] replacement rates in year 4
of 122 and 154 percent, respectively” 19 from all benefits. These payments give members of the
reserve component “even greater replacement for labor market earnings” than the active
component veterans. 20 In the fourth year following deployment, reservists who have been
seriously injured, defined as having sustained a life-altering injury, have income replacements of
143 percent and those who were very seriously injured, defined as having suffered a lifethreating injury, have income replacements of 183 percent. 21
The current VA disability compensation structure, therefore, meets the original intent of
Congress for such beneficiaries by providing a rough replacement for lost earning potential. 22
Veterans are expected to earn the remainder of the money required to sustain their livelihoods.
Disability compensation is vital to veterans and their families. Depending on the level of
disability, benefits may include tax-free monthly compensation, 23 access to health care for
service-connected disabilities, 24 and educational and employment opportunities. 25 Veterans with
the highest levels of service-connected disabilities may also receive compensation for housing
adaptations, 26 auto adaptations, 27 dependent health care 28 and education. 29 Benefits may be

15

See generally 38 C.F.R. § 4 (2018).
See RAND CORP., www.rand.org (last visited Oct. 4, 2019) (The RAND Corporation is a nonprofit
entity that offers research and analysis for policy issues to the U.S. military).
17
PAUL HEATON ET AL., Compensating Wounded Warriors, RAND NAT’L DEF. RESEARCH INST. xiii
(2012).
18
Id. at 47 (“(T)hose with very serious injuries receive $9,373 more in total household income in year 4
than they would have received had they not been injured.”).
19
Id. at 52.
20
Id. at 48.
21
Id. at 52.
22
Supra notes 6, 17.
23
See generally 38 U.S.C. §§ 1101-63 (2018); VA Disability Compensation, U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS
AFF., https://www.va.gov/disability/ (last visited Oct. 4, 2019).
24
See generally 38 U.S.C. §§ 1701-61 (2018); VA Health Care, U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFF.,
https://www.va.gov/health-care/ (last visited Oct. 4, 2019).
25
See generally 38 U.S.C. §§ 3100-22 (2018); Vocational Rehabilitation and Employment, U.S. DEP’T OF
VETERANS AFF., https://www.benefits.va.gov/vocrehab/ (last visited Oct. 4, 2019).
26
See generally 38 U.S.C. §§ 2101-09 (2018); VA Home Loans, U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFF.,
https://www.benefits.va.gov/homeloans/adaptedhousing.asp (last visited Oct. 4, 2019).
27
See generally 38 U.S.C. §§ 3901-04 (2018); VA Automobile Allowance and Adaptive Equipment, U.S.
DEP’T OF VETERANS AFF., https://www.va.gov/disability/eligibility/special-claims/automobile-allowance-adaptiveequipment/ (last visited Oct. 4, 2019).
16
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critically important to making disabled veterans and their families whole for their injuries,
wounds, and illnesses. Barriers to receiving these benefits conflict with the purpose of the
system. The VA’s mission is “[t]o care for him who shall have borne the battle, and for his
widow, and his orphan. . . .” 30 Consequently, it is neither advisable, nor in keeping with the spirit
of a grateful nation, in caring for those who have been injured, wounded, or developed illnesses
as a result of their military service to impose additional burdens on receiving these benefits. The
veteran has upheld his/her end of the bargain by serving the nation, and the government must
follow through on its obligation to care for them.
Veterans with service-related disabilities apply for VA disability compensation for a variety
of reasons. A veteran must have a disability incurred or aggravated during military service. 31 It
can take years or even decades for some veterans to prove their eligibility for benefits. 32 Many
times this is due to a lack of in-service record keeping of injuries or conditions incurred while the
service member was active. 33 Although the VA’s disability compensation program is meant to be
pro-veteran, it can be difficult for veterans to receive their benefits.
It is important to understand why veterans who face substantial barriers in seeking
compensation choose to endure the process. For example, are they seeking monetary benefits to
replace income lost in the workforce due to their disabilities? Are they seeking validation for
their conditions? What is the impact of going through the disability compensation application
process on them 34—a process that can be quite lengthy? 35
28
38 U.S.C. § 1781; Community Care, U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFF.,
https://www.va.gov/COMMUNITYCARE/programs/dependents/champva/index.asp (last visited Oct. 4, 2019).
29
See generally 38 U.S.C. §§ 3500-66 (2018); Education and Training, U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFF.,
https://www.benefits.va.gov/gibill/survivor_dependent_assistance.asp (last visited Oct. 4, 2019).
30
About VA, U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFF., https://www.va.gov/about_va/mission.asp (last visited Oct. 4,
2019).
31
38 U.S.C. § 1110 (2018).
32
The VA publishes weekly reports called Monday Morning Workload Reports that include the average
number of days that a newly filed claim takes for the VA to complete. Veterans Benefits Administration Reports,
U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFF, https://www.benefits.va.gov/reports/detailed_claims_data.asp (last visited Nov. 2,
2019). As of August 2019, the average number of days an original claim took from filing to the decision was 112
days. This data, however, does not include the time that it takes for a claim to be finally decided if it is appealed past
the initial decision. According to the Board of Veterans’ Appeals Annual Report to Congress for Fiscal Year 2018,
the average number of days elapsed from the time an appeal was initiated until a final Board decision was 1,703
days or over four years. U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFF., BD. OF VETERANS’ APPEALS, ANN. REP. (2018),
https://www.bva.va.gov/docs/Chairmans_Annual_Rpts/BVA2018AR.pdf.
33
Although the VA does not make information publicly available revealing categorical reasons why claims
are denied, practitioners, including the authors, routinely witness disability claims being denied for lack of in-service
notations of an injury, symptoms, or condition.
34
Nina A. Sayer et al., Veterans Seeking Disability Benefits for Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder: Who
Applies and the Self-Reported Meaning of Disability Compensation, 58, SOC. SCI. & MED. 2133-43 (2004),
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/8653925_Veterans_seeking_disability_benefits_for_posttraumatic_stress_disorder_Who_applies_and_the_self-reported_meaning_of_disability_compensation (“Veterans
who apply for service connection for [PTSD] must be sufficiently motivated not only to undergo the steps involved
in the compensation application process, but also to describe their trauma histories to virtual strangers.”).
35
As of September 2019, disability compensation claims may take on average ninety-two days for the VA
to process. The VA Claim Process After You File Your Claim, U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFF.,
https://www.va.gov/disability/after-you-file-claim/ (last visited on Nov. 2, 2019).
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Understanding the goals of veterans in applying for disability compensation can help
determine what types of incentives will help them to take advantage of the programs and services
that help them to meet their life goals. 36 A 2004 study surveyed the reasons veterans sought VA
disability compensation for post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). 37
The study provided interesting insights into why Vietnam-era veterans applied for VA
benefits. Of those surveyed, seventy-five percent believed “that becoming service connected for
PTSD was important because ‘it will show that the government acknowledges how I was
affected by my military experiences’ and ‘it will show that there is a reason for my problems.’” 38
Only about half of these veterans “were receiving any mental health treatment at the time of
application.” 39 But more than fifty percent said they did so because “’[i]f I get service connected
for PTSD, I can focus on getting better.’” 40 Interestingly, the importance of the financial aspects
of compensation was only important for approximately twenty-five to thirty-five percent of
applicants. 41 Thus, they intended to get help to meet their health care goals. 42
The process of applying for disability compensation is already complicated. Additional
requirements could prompt veterans to avoid the process altogether, which would negatively
impact their health and well-being. For example, forty-five percent of veterans in the survey of
those seeking compensation for PTSD agreed with the statement that being awarded disability
compensation would make them “feel less like a failure.” 43 Considering that veterans are
committing suicide at a rate of 1.5 times to that of non-veterans, 44 veterans’ views on why they
seek disability compensation should not be ignored.
Aside from disability compensation, the VA also provides a variety of other types of benefits.
In some circumstances, the VA takes into account whether a veteran can obtain and maintain
employment as a basis for granting those benefits.
One benefit defined solely by a veteran’s ability to obtain and maintain employment is called
“individual unemployability.” The VA grants this benefit to veterans who cannot work because
36

Sayer, supra note 34, at 2134 (“It would be important to know what disability applicants hope to achieve
through the obtainment of disability status, and then subsequently to determine whether those goals are better
attained through participation in a disability program or through other means.”).
37
Id. at 2134-35.
38
Id. at 2138; Douglas Mossman, MD, Veterans Affairs Disability Compensation: A Case Study in
Countertherapeutic Jurisprudence, 24 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 1, 27-44 (1996),
https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/2f21/38f6c1f8ca42b30c165aa7b8146aa8b91180.pdf (stating that becoming 100
percent service disabled “vindicates their past sacrifices to country and fully justifies poor social and work
function”).
39
Sayer, supra note 34, at 2133, 2137.
40
Id. at 2138.
41
Id. at 2139.
42
See id. at 2138 (stating that the motive for seeking compensation to improve the disability “contrasts
with the disincentive assumptions regarding disability benefits.”).
43
Id. at 2140 (The researchers further discovered that for low-income veterans’ validation about their
disabilities was even more critical than it was for higher-income veterans.).
44
News Release, U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFF. (Sept. 20, 2019),
https://www.va.gov/opa/pressrel/includes/viewPDF.cfm?id=5317.
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of their service-connected disabilities. 45 Their compensation is set at the 100 percent level even
though his/her actual disability rating is below 100 percent. 46
Veterans seeking individual unemployability benefits must provide detailed information
regarding their last employment and any attempts to find jobs since becoming disabled. 47 The
VA requires a veteran’s prior employers to complete a form stating the amount of time the
veteran lost from work due to disability, how much the veteran got paid, why the veteran stopped
working, and other details. 48 The VA grants individual unemployability benefits only after
confirming that a veteran is unable to secure substantially gainful employment due to his/her
service-connected disability. 49
The VA also has a program, called Vocational Rehabilitation and Employment (VR&E), to
help veterans return to employment fit for their capabilities and service-connected disabilities. Its
goal is “to help [veterans] with job training, employment accommodations, resume development,
and job seeking skills.” 50 VR&E can include payment for post-secondary training or education. 51
In this program, much like for the individual unemployability benefit, the primary factor is
whether a veteran can be employed. 52 Once the VA establishes that a veteran has an employment
handicap due to a service-connected disability, the veteran is eligible for the VR&E program to
enter an occupation that he/she can perform with their disability.
The cost of benefits paid to disabled veterans has drawn attention from policymakers and
Congress. VA benefits, including disability compensation, are a mandatory expenditure within
the VA’s budget. 53 Mandatory spending is a majority of the federal budget 54 and includes
programs such as Social Security and Medicare.
Spending on disability compensation has increased in recent years. The VA’s fiscal year
2020 budget request to Congress for benefits was $123.1 billion in mandatory spending, a 7.5
45

38 C.F.R. § 4.18 (2018).
38 C.F.R. §§ 3.341, 4.16, 4.18 (2019).
47
Veteran’s Application for Increased Compensation Based on Unemployability, U.S. DEP’T OF
VETERANS AFF. (Oct. 2017), https://www.vba.va.gov/pubs/forms/VBA-21-8940-ARE.pdf (requiring veterans to list
all employment for the last five years, everywhere that the veteran tried to obtain employment since he/she became
too disabled to work, as well as all schooling and other training that the veteran has engaged in).
48
Request for Employment Information in Connection with Claim for Disability Benefits, U.S. DEP’T OF
VETERANS AFF. (Sept. 2017), https://www.vba.va.gov/pubs/forms/VBA-21-4192-ARE.pdf.
49
38 C.F.R. § 4.16 (2018).
50
Vocational Rehabilitation and Employment (VR&E), U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFF.,
https://www.benefits.va.gov/vocrehab/index.asp (last visited Nov. 2, 2019).
51
Vocational Rehabilitation and Employment (VR&E), Eligibility and Entitlement, DEP’T OF VETERANS
AFF., https://www.benefits.va.gov/vocrehab/eligibility_and_entitlement.asp (last visited Nov. 2, 2019).
52
38 C.F.R. §§ 4.16, 4.18 (2018).
53
VA health care is a discretionary expenditure and, therefore, subject to different rules than the Statutory
Pay-As-You-Go Act. See generally Budget of the U.S. Government, OFF. OF BUDGET (2019),
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/BUDGET-2019-BUD/pdf/BUDGET-2019-BUD.pdf [hereinafter President’s
Budget Request].
54
What is the difference between mandatory and discretionary spending?, CONG. BUDGET OFF.,
https://www.cbo.gov/content/what-difference-between-mandatory-and-discretionary-spending (last visited Nov. 2,
2019).
46
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percent increase, or $6.5 billion more, than for the fiscal year 2019 55 and up from $95.6 billion in
2015. 56
“The Veteran population has been declining since 1990 while the number of veterans with
service-connected disabilities has risen” 57 as a result of combat operations overseas. In 2008, 2.9
million veterans had service-connected disabilities, and by 2015, that number had risen to nearly
4.2 million.58 By 2019, the total number had increased to 4.89 million. 59
Veterans are also receiving disability compensation at higher ratings than in previous years.
As of June 30, 2019, more than 750,000 veterans received disability compensation at the 70-100
percent rate. 60 This is in sharp contrast to only approximately 83,000 veterans receiving
disability compensation at the 70-100 percent rate in 2000. 61
The steep climb in the VA’s benefits budget corresponds with veterans having higher
disability ratings and more veterans receiving benefits, even though there are fewer veterans than
in previous years. At the same time, there are concerns that disability compensation’s monetary
benefits create disincentives for veterans to improve their health or work for fear that they will
lose their benefits. Specifically, is disability compensation counter therapeutic for veterans who
might improve with treatment? 62 Should it matter whether or not veterans choose to improve,
when it is possible? 63
Yes, because although treatment may improve a veteran’s condition it may also have
consequences for his/her disability rating and end eligibility for certain benefits. For this reason,
some argue that receiving disability compensation may discourage veterans from returning to, or
remain in, the workforce. 64 After being out of the workforce for a long time, some veterans may
55

President’s Budget Request, supra note 53, at 117.
Id.
57
Statistical Trends: Veterans with a Service-Connected Disability, 1990 to 2018, U.S. DEP’T OF
VETERANS AFF. 4 (2019), https://www.va.gov/vetdata/docs/Quickfacts/SCD_trends_FINAL_2018.pdf.
58
Id.
59
VA Benefits & Health Care Utilization, U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFF. (Apr. 30, 2019),
https://www.va.gov/vetdata/docs/pocketcards/fy2019q4.PDF.
60
Id.
61
Veterans Benefits Administration Annual Benefits Report, U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFF. 17 (2000),
https://www.benefits.va.gov/REPORTS/abr/docs/2000_abr.pdf.
62
See Mossman, supra note 38, at 35; B. Christopher Frueh et al., U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs
Disability Policies for Posttraumatic Stress Disorder: Administrative Trends and Implications for Treatment,
Rehabilitation, and Research, 97 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH. 12, 2143 (2007),
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2089098/pdf/0972143.pdf; see also Richard J. McNally & B.
Christopher Frueh, Why are Iraq and Afghanistan War veterans seeking PTSD disability compensation at
unprecedented rates?, J. OF ANXIETY DISORDERS 524 (2013) (stating that the effect of the VA’s outreach to veterans
about the incidence of PTSD may have the effect of “fostering an expectation of permanent disability”.).
63
Frueh, supra note 62, at 2143 (explaining that an analysis showed that sixty-seven percent of individuals
who finished treatment for PTSD “no longer met criteria for the disorder”; however, “little evidence of efficacy was
found among veteran samples”).
64
See Mossman, supra note 38, at 33-34 (noting that community service providers informed the VA that
they had on several occasions, “heard these men talk of their unwillingness to participate in employment efforts
because they do receive that money [VA compensation]”); see Frueh, supra note 62, at 2143, quoting Drew D., et
56
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be convinced that they are not able to work, and thus get discouraged about returning to work. 65
In fact, returning to work may be a factor itself in VA’s decision to lower a veteran’s disability
rating. 66
II.

CRITICS OF THE CURRENT VA DISABILITY SYSTEM

Those critical of the current VA disability structure note that there are few, if any, incentives
for veterans to improve their health and reduce their disability rating. 67 Further, critics argue that
there are more disincentives than incentives for veterans to get better.
Some legislators and policy advocates assert that providing financial compensation to
disabled veterans actually harms them by making them dependent and discouraging them from
seeking treatment for remediable conditions. 68 These individuals contend that cash benefits to a
veteran penalizes the veteran for returning to work, particularly if they are also granted
individual unemployability benefits, and may hamper their ability to become a productive
member of society again. 69 They allege that veterans are encouraged to view themselves as
disabled and, potentially, suffer “the humiliation of government dependency.” 70
Proponents of changing the VA disability model point to the 1990 Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA) 71 to argue that having a disability does not mean an individual is
unemployable. After the enactment of the ADA, most employers were required to make
reasonable accommodations for disabled employees. 72 Critics contend the VA’s disability
system, which focuses on compensatory payments, misses opportunities to help veterans get
rehabilitation, retraining, and reorientation to participate in the labor market. 73 But this argument
downplays existing VA programs such as VR&E that are specifically designed to help veterans
return to the workforce.
al., Effects of disability compensation on participation in and outcomes of vocational rehabilitation, Psychiatric
Serv. 2001;52:1479–84: (“[D]isability benefits unintentionally discourage full participation in vocational
rehabilitation and result in significantly worse rehabilitation outcomes”.).
65
Mossman, supra note 38, at 34 (quoting ESTROFF S.E., MAKING IT CRAZY: AN ETHNOGRAPHY OF
PSYCHIATRIC CLIENTS IN AN AMERICAN COMMUNITY, reprinted in THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE: THE LAW AS A
THERAPEUTIC AGENT 70 (Wexler D.B. Durham 1990)) (“Not working is seen as both symptom and proof of their
disabilities and deficits.”).
66
See 38 C.F.R. § 4.130 (2018) (stating that the severity of a veteran’s mental health condition typically
takes into account involvement in the workforce and availability to be around other individuals).
67
David Shulkin & Kyle Sheetz, Reforming veterans benefits will be controversial, but necessary, THE
HILL (Jan. 6, 2019), https://thehill.com/opinion/white-house/424037-reforming-veterans-benefits-will-becontroversial-but-necessary.
68
Daniel Gade, Don’t Disable Wounded Veterans with Money, PHILANTHROPY (2013),
https://www.philanthropyroundtable.org/philanthropy-magazine/article/summer-2013-don%27t-disable-woundedveterans-with-money.
69
Id.
70
Phil Harvey & Lisa Conyers, Op-Ed: From war to welfare: Disabled veterans deserve better, LOS
ANGELES TIMES (Nov. 11, 2015), https://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-1111-harvey-conyers-veteransdisability-20151111-story.html.
71
Americans with Disability Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327.
72
42 U.S.C. § 12112 (2018).
73
Id.
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Critics have used these contentions to influence not only legislation, but also charitable
organizations by discouraging them from engaging in actions that may “decrease a veteran’s
desire to participate in the labor force, while encouraging “sweat-equity requirements, financial
co-pays, and concrete expectations of employment.” 74 These positions are based on the
presumption that veterans who receive a “ hand out” are less likely to want to work. Although
charitable organizations do not directly impact the provision of benefits through the VA system,
their actions lend credibility to the critics, and the same principles used to influence those
organizations are then echoed in Congress.
There is limited research supporting these arguments. In 2015, the National Bureau of
Economic Research explored the impacts of expanding disability-compensation eligibility for
Vietnam veterans in terms of the overall number of military veterans in the workforce. 75 It
examined Vietnam veterans who became eligible for VA disability compensation as a result of
expanding benefits for those with type 2 diabetes. 76 It concluded that the expansion of benefits
had a significant effect on the labor supply of Vietnam-era veterans, in that eighteen percent
who became eligible for benefits dropped out of the labor force. 77 A 2007 congressional study
analyzed the average employment rate of service-disabled male veterans compared to the general
population and to non-disabled veterans. 78 It reported that disabled veterans are employed at
lower numbers than the other groups, but that the gap varies based on age. 79 Disabled veterans in
their twenties and thirties are employed only five percent less than non-disabled veterans. 80 By
age fifty, disabled veterans are employed twenty-four percent less. The gap narrows with
advancing age, where both disabled and non-disabled men are less likely to work. 81
Other research and statistics, however, have supported the position that the VA disability
system does not discourage veterans from seeking medical treatment or seeking or retaining
employment.
The 2004 National Defense Authorization Act created a Veterans’ Disability Benefits
Commission to assess the appropriateness of VA benefits for disabled veterans and their
survivors. 82 The commission issued a report in 2007 that explored whether VA benefits become
disincentives for disabled veterans to work or to receive recommended treatment or therapy, after
having surveyed veterans to determine how many avoided medical treatment because they did
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not want their disability compensation reduced. 83 The commission reported “that only 0.45
percent … do not accept, exactly follow, or complete … medical treatment” due to concerns that
their disability benefits may be impacted. 84 It also stated that, as their disability rating increased,
a veteran was less likely to be concerned that complying with medical-treatment
recommendations would impact their benefits. 85 However, the study estimated that only twelve
percent of disabled veterans do not seek employment because of their disability benefits. 86 The
commission concluded that “veterans failing to comply with recommended medical treatments
because they felt it might impact their disability benefits do not appear to be an issue” and “VA
compensation providing a disincentive to work is not an issue.” 87
In 2016, the U.S. Department of Labor’s Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) analyzed this
question. The BLS compared the labor supply of veterans with disabilities to those that were not
disabled. 88 It concluded that changes made to the disability system in 2000 that “expanded
benefits” did not appear to cause any decrease in disabled veterans participating in the
workforce. 89
A study to evaluate the impact of disability compensation on treatment outcomes was
conducted between 2005 and 2010 with a sample of over 775 veterans who sought inpatient care
for PTSD through the VA’s specialized PTSD programs. 90 It examined the impact of
compensation status to determine whether veterans of Iraq and Afghanistan had different
expectations about treatment and outcomes than veterans of other eras. 91 The study focused on
veterans receiving disability compensation, seeking compensation, and seeking an increase in
their disability rating. 92 The number of veterans not receiving compensation was too low to be
considered statistically significant for study. 93
The study found that veterans with positive expectations about their treatment had longer
stays in treatment and a commensurate decrease in their symptoms. 94 Although veterans who
seek an increase in their disability rating for PTSD have lower expectations for their treatment
prospects, researchers found “no significant differences in symptoms at discharge between
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veterans seeking increased compensation and veterans receiving compensation.” 95 Veterans
seeking, but not yet receiving, disability compensation “[do] not report lower treatment
expectations or endorse greater symptoms at discharge.” 96 Thus, the researchers concluded there
is no apparent connection between symptoms reported and those veterans’ compensation
status. 97 The data indicate that veterans report the same symptoms regardless of compensation
status, contrary to the assertions by some researchers that veterans exaggerate symptoms to
increase compensation. 98
Moreover, another study focused on the impact of changes to the VA’s disability
compensation system for Vietnam veterans, with the addition of type 2 diabetes as a condition
presumptively related to military service due to exposure to the toxic herbicide Agent Orange. 99
Unsurprisingly, the study concluded that the addition resulted in increased enrollment in the
disability program and, correspondingly, increased expenditures. 100 However, data analysis
provides little support for any correlation between an increase in the number of veterans who
receive disability compensation and their participation in the labor force. 101 Although veterans’
higher disability ratings result in a decrease in labor participation, it is not clear whether the
decrease is due to the increased financial compensation or the severity of disability. 102 The
researchers noted that compensation alone does not prompt veterans to exit the workforce,
probably because a veteran may remain employed while receiving benefits, but they suggested
that a veteran’s unemployment may prompt them to apply for disability benefits. 103
A study published in 2015 based on different data showed that Vietnam veterans have lower
levels of workforce participation, following a liberalization of service-connected disability
benefits. 104 Notably, veterans who are unable to work as a result of their service-connected
disabilities may be eligible for disability compensation at the 100 percent rate even though their
actual rating is less than 100 percent if they are determined to be unemployable. 105 The authors
of this study argued that veterans able to receive individual unemployability benefits have left
95
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the workforce. 106 Further, they conclude that, because veterans may receive both Social Security
Disability Insurance (SSDI) and VA benefits at the same time, the “receipt of either DC [VA
disability compensation] or SSDI benefits increases the odds of [a veteran] applying for the
other.” 107 Another study, however, examined the impact of relaxed rules for establishing service
connection for Vietnam and Gulf War veterans with certain disabilities, noting a correlation
between liberalization and veterans leaving the workforce, but also citing the likelihood of other
factors being at play. 108
In contrast to critics of the current VA disability system, the above referenced studies suggest
that veterans who are receiving disability compensation do not necessarily leave the workforce.
Further, when they do leave the workforce, it is not proven that their decision is prompted by the
mere receipt of disability compensation. In light of the importance of disability compensation to
veterans and their families, it would be unwise to change the current scheme without some
definitive proof that the changes would provide long-term benefits to them.
III.

PROPOSALS TO CHANGE THE VA DISABILITY SYSTEM

Since at least 1996, proposals have been made to change the type of disability payment from
monthly to lump-sum, and to change the timing of the payment to be at the time of transition
from active duty to veteran status. 109 One advantage of these changes would be to increase
incentives for veterans to rehabilitate, so they can work again. 110
Some proposals focus on requiring veterans to “get well” to return to the workforce and no
longer receive disability compensation. 111 For example, in 2016, one member of Congress
proposed introducing legislation that would condition the receipt of disability compensation for
PTSD on the veteran’s participation in mental-health services provided by the VA. 112 This was
intended to deter a veteran from receiving compensation for a condition he/she did not wish to
improve. The legislation was not introduced after the congressional representative discussed the
proposal with veterans service organizations that promised to oppose it.
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Other similar proposals have periodically been discussed during times when Congress has
attempted to perform a dramatic overhaul to the veterans’ disability system. Despite the identical
outcomes of both the 2016 BLS analysis 113 and the 2007 Veterans’ Disability Benefits
Commission report 114 that veterans do not voluntarily remain unemployed or avoid medical
treatment, a common misconception still persists that veterans refuse treatment in order to
receive monetary benefits. 115 Much of this perception, however, seems to be based on anecdotal
evidence because no studies have reached this conclusion despite the fact that researchers have
examined it.
In 2019, former VA Secretary David Shulkin proposed that the VA should incentivize
veterans’ well-being and financial independence by linking disability compensation and health
care. 116 Shulkin’s plan seemed driven by growing costs. Shulkin cited to the fact that the budget
for VA benefits in 2009 was $100 billion, which had “more than quadrupled since the year
2000.” 117 His proposal was to require veterans seeking disability compensation to actively
receive medical treatment, so they could become employable and no longer need disability
compensation. 118 Shulkin cited the study about veterans becoming eligible for disability
compensation due to type 2 diabetes, which did not definitely conclude that those veterans left
the workforce as a result of receiving disability benefits, but Shulkin did not address the other
two reports described herein that contradicted his assertion.
The issue is not new to the federal government. Congressional and presidential commissions
have long turned their attention towards the issue of disability compensation. In 1996, Congress
commissioned a report on the VA’s benefit claims adjudication system. 119 Known as the
Melidosian Report, 120 it compared the increase of VA claims to claims in SSDI, Federal
Employees’ Compensation, and other similar programs administered by state governments and
private insurance companies. 121 The commission found that all the related programs experienced
unexpected growth and shifts over the preceding decade. 122 The number of claims has increased
each year, across programs, whereas the number of beneficiaries recovering, or otherwise
leaving the programs, has decreased. 123 These changes have prompted other disability programs
to redefine “disability” and restructure insurance policies. 124 The commission also noted that the
VA’s disability compensation program is intended to compensate for lost earning capacity,
whereas commercial disability insurance aims to achieve “maximum medical recovery,” then get
recipients back to work. 125 In its report, although other proposals were made about the way VA
113
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handles claims adjudication and other matters, the commission ultimately did not recommend
that the VA’s goals be changed to mirror those of commercial disability insurance programs.
In 2007, President George W. Bush formed the President’s Commission on Care for
America’s Returning Wounded Warriors 126, and tasked it with examining and recommending
improvements for returning injured service members’ transition to civilian life. The commission
suggested that, in administering a disability compensation program, the VA’s goal should be to
return veterans to their normal activities as quickly as possible. 127 The commission added that it
is necessary to incentivize veterans to rehabilitate, and recommended the integration of
vocational rehabilitation and disability compensation. 128 Currently as the two programs still
operate independently, veterans need not participate in VR&E to obtain disability benefits. 129
It is doubtful, however, whether the VA can tie each veteran’s disability compensation to
their participation in VR&E. In 2008, Congress mandated that the VA conduct a twenty-year
longitudinal study of VR&E to determine the long-term outcomes associated with this
program. 130 A 2018 interim report notes that some ninety percent of veterans who participate in
VR&E were employed the preceding year. 131 The 2018 fiscal-year cost of VR&E was $1.67
billion132 and, in that year, 12,126 veterans successfully completed the program. 133 The cost per
veteran was more than $137,000. The study does not provide information on whether the amount
of those veterans’ disability compensation was reduced. It is possible that, even after becoming
employed, they continue to receive the same amount of disability compensation as they had prior
to participating in the VR&E program.
Government agencies have also proposed budget savings targeting veterans’ benefits. Each
year, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) examines options to reduce spending. In recent
years, the CBO has suggested that the government terminate individual unemployability benefits
for veterans once they reach the age of sixty-seven. 134 This would end benefits for approximately
235,000 veterans and save $47.6 billion over ten years. 135 The rationale for this change is that, at
age sixty-seven, a veteran would likely not work, regardless of disability. 136 Advocates of such a
change question why the VA should continue paying unemployability benefits to those who
would not likely remain employed, given their age. 137
126
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Non-governmental entities have also proposed drastic changes to the VA system. One
proposal by psychiatrist Dr. Douglas Mossman suggests three changes that would attempt to
address some Congressional concerns about the cost of benefits and also increase a veteran’s
ability to exercise autonomy over all aspects of their life. 138 The first change would end the
dynamic nature of the current system and replace it with a specific determination from a point in
time. 139 Payments could be made in lump sum, similar to tort settlements, or monthly, as they
currently are. 140 Dr. Mossman argues that such a change would allow veterans the freedom to
pursue health-care treatments as they choose and eliminate concerns about how health-care
providers document improvements in a veteran’s health condition. 141 Mossman acknowledges
that such a change would eliminate the ability of veterans to receive increases in their ratings and
compensation if their condition deteriorates. 142
Mossman’s second proposed change would tie the amount of compensation received to the
amount the veteran loses based on their skills and career path. 143 This would mean different
levels of compensation for veterans with similar disabilities but different skill levels. A third
change would remove an increase in pay for veterans hospitalized for longer than twenty days
and require copayments to incentivize judicious use of the VA’s health care system. 144
Although such changes may help veterans to better direct their health care goals by removing
possible disincentives, they would fundamentally alter the current approach of the nation toward
its responsibility to care for injured veterans. They would repeal benefits and add burdens by
implementing copayments. Solutions that place more burden on veterans to care for their servicerelated disabilities are not the right choice for our veterans or our nation, considering an allvolunteer military force and decades of war. If an all-volunteer force is to be maintained during a
time of unending conflict, then veterans must be able to receive care and benefits without
additional burden. Otherwise, our nation may be unable to sustain our military without resorting
to compulsory service requirements.
IV.

UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONDITIONS

Is it permissible under the U.S. Constitution to require veterans to seek medical treatment
and/or employment as a condition of receiving disability compensation? Congress would need to
consider this question before imposing such requirements on veterans.
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The Constitution does not require benefits to veterans for disabilities related to their service.
From the beginnings of the nation, however, military service has provided veterans with a variety
of benefits. 145 Following the ratification of the Constitution in 1789, Congress has continued the
pension system for veterans originally established by the Continental Congress. 146 Benefits have
continued to expand as military service falls on a smaller number of Americans due in part to an
all-volunteer force. 147
The government may not impose conditions for the receipt of those benefits that violate the
recipient’s constitutional rights. 148 The issue arises “when government offers a benefit on
condition that the recipient perform or forego an activity that a preferred constitutional right
normally protect[ed] from government interference.” 149 Requirements on benefits that touch on
fundamental constitutional rights are subject to strict scrutiny. 150 These fundamental rights
include exercise of religion, 151 the right to travel, 152 and freedom of speech. 153 To be
constitutional, the requirement must serve a compelling state interest. 154
In Sherbert v. Verner, the U.S. Supreme Court held that a state’s denial of unemployment
benefits as a result of an individual’s refusal to accept employment that would conflict with the
free exercise of religion was an impermissible burden on a constitutional right. 155 The Court
stated that “not only is it apparent that appellant’s declared ineligibility for benefits derives
solely from the practice of her religion, but the pressure upon her to forego that practice is
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unmistakable.” 156 The Court further found that the state provided no compelling interest
justifying the burden. 157
In Shapiro v. Thompson, the Court held that imposing a residency requirement that limited
eligibility for the receipt of welfare benefits was not permissible. 158 The appellants in the case,
multiple states and the District of Columbia, sought to justify the requirement for satisfying the
residence condition to receive welfare benefits based on the need to ensure the fiscal health of
the program to serve their long-term residents. 159 The Court agreed that the residency
requirement served its purpose, which was to deter needy residents from moving for any reason,
however, held that such a purpose is an unconstitutional violation of the right to travel. 160 A law
must have an objective that meets the need of a state other than to penalize an individual for
exercising their constitutional rights. 161
In Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, the Court relied on Shapiro to reverse the
Arizona Supreme Court’s decision to uphold a state law requiring counties to provide medical
care to low-income residents only if the resident met a one-year residency requirement. 162 The
Court determined that a fundamental constitutional right, the right to travel, was implicated and
thus the state must have a compelling reason for the requirement. 163 Of note, the Court said that
whether or not the beneficiary was in receipt of federal funds was irrelevant to Shapiro’s penalty
analysis. 164
Despite the Court’s holdings of unconstitutional conditions in these cases, its application of
the doctrine “is riven with inconsistencies.” 165 For example, the Court has held that a state’s
failure to subsidize the exercise of a right, such as the right to bear children, is not
unconstitutional. 166 In Dandridge v. Williams, the Court upheld a state’s decision to impose
limits on welfare payments available to recipients even though the result led to unequal treatment
of families based on size. 167 Although welfare benefits provide essential support to low-income
families, the Court stated that the proper standard to test the constitutionality of the statute was
whether the state had a rational basis for its decision to limit benefits to larger families. 168 The
Court found that the state indeed had a “legitimate interest in encouraging employment and in
156
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avoiding discrimination between welfare families and the families of the working poor.” 169 As
the case law demonstrates, the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions has limits.
Is refusing to access medical treatment a right that is protected by the Constitution? If so, the
question is whether there is a state interest able to overcome the strict scrutiny that courts apply
to such challenges. 170 If the right to refuse health care is not a fundamental right, 171 then the state
must simply have a rational basis to compel acceptance of medical treatment. 172
The courts have long recognized that individuals have a right to bodily integrity. 173 Persons
have the right to control what happens to their bodies and must provide assent to any touching,
including for medical purposes, of their persons. 174 Over time, informed consent and
constitutional protections have served as the basis for the right to refuse medical treatment. 175
In Washington v. Harper, 176 the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that mentally ill inmates have a
constitutional right to refuse medication in some circumstances. 177 The Court found that these
inmates have a liberty interest derived from the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. 178
The Court stated that “[t]he forcible injection of medication into a nonconsenting person’s body
represents a substantial interference with that person’s liberty.” 179
In Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dept. of Health, the Court recognized a constitutionally
protected right to liberty based on the Due Process Clause in finding that an individual may
refuse medical treatment, even when needed to sustain life. 180 The Court stated that the ability of
an adult to refuse medical treatment is “the logical corollary of the doctrine of informed
consent.” 181 This is true even in situations where the refusal of medical treatment will likely
result in the individual’s death. 182
There are limits, however, to individuals’ ability to refuse medical treatment. Rights can be
limited in balancing the interests of the state with those of the individual’s liberty interest to
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avoid medical treatment. 183 In Harper, the Court held that a state’s law allowing for involuntary
treatment represented an “accommodation between an inmate’s liberty interest in avoiding the
forced administration of antipsychotic drugs and the State’s interests in providing appropriate
medical treatment to reduce the danger that an inmate suffering from a serious mental disorder
represents to himself or others.” 184 Later, in Riggins v. Nevada, 185 the Court found that it would
not have been a violation of due process for a state to forcibly medicate an individual who was
incarcerated while awaiting trial for murder and robbery, if the state proved “that treatment was
medically appropriate and, considering less intrusive alternatives, essential for the sake of [the
individual’s] own safety or the safety of others.” 186 In this case, the Court found that the state
had not sufficiently explored those alternatives. 187 In Sell v. United States, 188 the Court provided
further guidance to determine when the interests of the state are sufficient to outweigh the liberty
interest of the individual and justify the forced administration of medication. 189 A state must
have an important interest that can only be furthered by limiting an individual’s rights but the
limitation must be necessary and the least intrusive alternative. 190 Thus, the government may
compel medical treatment but only with limitations.
V.

IS REQUIRING MEDICAL TREATMENT AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONDITION ON THE
RECEIPT OF DISABILITY COMPENSATION BENEFITS?

An individual’s liberty right to refuse medical treatment under the Due Process Clause 191 can
be overcome by weighing the interests of the government against those of the individual. When
an adult is competent and not a danger to themselves or others, the government has limited
authority to require medical treatment. 192
For instance, the government does not compel Americans receiving SSDI or Medicare to
undergo therapy or take medications as a condition of receiving benefits, even though doing so
might make the individual more employable. Placing such a condition only on veterans would
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not serve any government interest and would most likely be deemed impermissible for a few
reasons.
It could be argued that the goal of returning individuals to work is too attenuated from a
requirement to seek health care. And the requirement to seek health care may have no effect on
the receipt of benefits such as SSDI. SSDI has different eligibility requirements from VA
disability compensation and 193 thus, veterans eligible for one benefit are not necessarily eligible
for the other. 194
The VA can require periodic medical exams to determine the ongoing status of a veteran’s
condition. In determining whether a veteran still meets the requirements of the benefit—a current
disability, such exams meets a justifiable interest. 195 They do not require the veteran to receive
treatment or take medicine. The exams simply allow the VA to determine the current disability
level. 196
Also, requiring veterans to seek medical treatment as a condition of receiving disability
compensation would allow the VA to manipulate veterans’ health status in a way that harms
personal liberty. The doctrine of unconstitutional conditions should guard against such
overreach. 197 Requiring medical treatment might lead to impermissible social control over
veteran’s lives. Although such control is permissible among service members because of the
need to ensure readiness to defend the country, it is not for veterans and the disabilities that
resulted from their service for the country.
VI.

IS REQUIRING TREATMENT PRACTICAL?

Veterans with service-connected disabilities are eligible for health care through the VA’s
Veterans Health Administration. 198 The VA provides acute health care to service-disabled
veterans via medical centers, community-based outpatient clinics, and community health care
providers. 199 The VA also provides long-term services and supports to veterans through VA
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provided home-based care programs, community living centers, as well as contracting with longterm care settings in the broader community to provide care for veterans. 200
Requiring veterans who may not want treatment to access VA care would likely exacerbate
costs and stretch capacity. As of March 2019, 4.84 million veterans were receiving disability
compensation benefits from the VA. 201 Approximately nine million veterans were enrolled in the
VA’s health care system in fiscal year (FY) 2018. 202 For FY 2019, Congress allocated $73.1
billion for veterans’ health care. 203
Priority access to VA health care depends on whether a veteran’s disability is “serviceconnected.” 204 The VA prioritizes how it allocates resources and the benefits that a veteran will
receive. 205 A total of eight priority groups provide eligibility based on factors such as disability
rating, eras of conflict and locations of service, presence of catastrophic disabilities, certain
awards and honors, and income status. 206 Veterans who are rated fifty percent or more are
assigned to priority group one. 207 Veterans rated at least thirty or forty percent are in group
two. 208 Veterans rated between ten and twenty percent are in group three. 209
Further, the VA has encountered more demands to increase these veteran’s access to care in
the last five years. In 2014, the VA’s health care system made national headlines due to wait
time scandals at the VA medical center in Phoenix, Arizona. 210 The scandal highlighted the
failure of Congress to fully invest in the VA’s health care system despite decades of conflict,
including the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. It also provided support for veterans seeking greater
access to health care in the community, outside of the VA system. 211 Following congressional
Benefits & Health Care Utilization, supra note 59. (There are approximately 170 VA medical centers and 1,240
outpatient medical facilities within the VA’s health care system).
200
Id.
201
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202
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210
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https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2014/05/21/veterans-healthcare-scandal-shinseki-timeline/9373227/;
Dennis Wagner, Deaths at Phoenix VA Hospital May Be Tied to Delayed Care, THE REPUBLIC (Apr. 9, 2014),
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(July 25, 2016), https://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/healthcare/288850-transforming-va-care-a-way-forward
(arguing for significant transformation within the VA health care system); Josh Keefe, Is the VA Being Privatized?
This Koch-Backed Group Says it Just Wants ‘Choice’ But Veterans Aren’t So Sure, NEWSWEEK (Apr. 5, 2018),
https://www.newsweek.com/koch-brothers-backed-group-could-determine-future-va-870693 (discussing the various
forces at play in the effort to transform the way the VA provides health care).

172

hearings 212 and the resignation of then VA Secretary Eric Shinseki, 213 Congress passed the
Veterans' Access to Care through Choice, Accountability, and Transparency Act of 2014, which
created the Veterans’ Choice Program. 214
The Veterans’ Choice Program increased opportunities for veterans to receive care in their
communities as a way to reduce pressure on the VA’s health facilities and providers. Congress
also passed the VA MISSION Act of 2018. 215 The VA MISSION Act further expanded access to
care in the community through the establishment of the Veterans Community Care Program. 216
The impact of the VA MISSION Act’s expanded access to health care on veterans and the VA’s
health care system will unfold over a long period of time.
In light of these challenges, it is difficult to see how the VA can handle providing additional
care should veterans be required to seek treatment as a condition for receiving disability
compensation. 217 Historically, fewer veterans have sought care than are enrolled in the VA
health care system. 218 Requiring veterans to seek medical treatments to ensure continued access
to their benefits would add a new burden on the current VA system.
In addition, Congress, which already faces enormous budget deficits, may not adequately
address the fiscal strain on the VA. Although the VA’s budget has increased in recent years
while most other agency budgets have not, the rising cost of providing care that in turn increased
the cost of disability compensation could result in pressure to limit benefits for veterans without
service-connected disabilities. Veterans with catastrophic disabilities have access to the VA’s
health care system under priority group four. 219 Would they lose access to VA care? It would be
of no gain to veterans, the budget, or society as a whole to shift the burden to Medicare and
Medicaid 220 to provide needed care for these veterans.
212
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Requiring medical care for veterans who may not want it and who may be able to do well
without it would likely have a negative impact on other veterans who depend on care for their
well-being. Care providers and administrators also would have to report to the Veterans Benefits
Administration (VBA) regarding an individual veteran’s compliance with their treatment
regimens. A mandate could damage the relationship between veterans and their health care
providers since their providers would play a role in veterans maintaining access to disability
compensation. Veterans should not be hindered from seeking benefits they have earned.
Congress and the VA should remove barriers to health care, rather than erect them.
Even if the VA’s health care system could handle the demands of requiring veterans to seek
health care to maintain their benefits, it is not clear that such an effort would be effective in
improving a veteran’s long-term health. Although the context is different, most states allow for a
person with mental illness to be subject to involuntary outpatient commitment, 221 even if the
individual is legally competent and not a danger to the public or themselves. 222 Also, as a
condition of remaining in the community, a court can require an individual, to follow a regimen
that often requires medication and other treatments. 223
But there is little evidence to show that involuntarily treatment leads to better outcomes. 224 In
fact, compelling treatment may cause those who could benefit from treatment to retreat due to
fear and loss of control. 225 It would also result in diverting funds from voluntary services and
supports. 226
It seems that improved health outcomes result “from the intensive services that have been
made available to participants rather than the existence of a court order mandating treatment.” 227
Alternatives to involuntary outpatient commitment include outreach and peer engagement. 228
Such services avoid more coercive treatment and focus on encouraging individuals with mental
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illness to enter into treatment. Feedback from a peer specialist, positive or negative, has been
associated with higher levels of motivation to seek treatment. 229
As evidenced in the above example, it is doubtful whether forced treatment would be
effective. An individual’s freedom to accept or decline treatment appears to be a better predictor
of success than a requirement to seek treatment. Mandated treatment would put new burdens on
the VBA if a veteran did not comply. There are many steps to remove benefits, as a veteran has a
property interest in the benefit and due process must be followed. 230 VBA would face additional
burdens if required to track treatment and subsequently remove benefits from those who do not
comply with imposed requirements.
VII.

IS IT PERMISSIBLE TO REQUIRE EMPLOYMENT AS A CONDITION OF RECEIVING A
BENEFIT?
Another condition for receiving disability compensation urged by some policy makers is to
require veterans to seek employment. Work requirements in exchange for government benefits is
not a new idea. 231 Welfare reform in 1996 included new work requirements for beneficiaries, 232
and some states have implemented work requirements to receive Medicaid benefits. 233

The constitutional implications of such requirements have not been addressed by the
courts. 234 This includes consideration of whether such work requirements are constitutional
under the Thirteenth Amendment. 235 Recent lawsuits challenging Medicaid work requirements
have focused on whether they violate Medicaid’s authorizing statutes as opposed to
constitutional implications of involuntary servitude in exchange for a needed health care
benefit. 236 Based on the U.S. Supreme Court’s precedent, 237 it is likely that a challenge to work
229
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requirements based on an unconstitutional condition would be unsuccessful. Instead, consider
whether a work requirement as a condition for receiving disability compensation would be
practical.
Work provides individuals with a variety of important benefits. First and foremost, it allows
individuals to meet their basic material needs. Pride in providing for one’s self and family, or
contributing to society, however, may be even more valuable to individuals. This may be
especially true for persons with disabilities. Not working can lead to feelings of worthlessness,
anxiety, and depression. 238
According to data released in March 2019 by the BLS, veterans with service-connected
disabilities had higher unemployment rates, 5.2 percent versus 3.5 percent in August 2018, than
those without disabilities. 239 During the reporting period, nearly thirty percent of respondents
reported having a VA service-connected disability rated at less than thirty percent. 240
Approximately forty percent of veterans reported having a VA disability rating of greater than
sixty percent. 241 Of these veterans, over fifty-five percent of those with disability ratings of less
than thirty percent were in the labor force compared to forty percent of those with disability
ratings of sixty percent or greater. 242
Many factors may play a role in a veteran’s decision about whether it is possible to work
with a service-connected disability. One is the assumptions that potential employers make about
the needs and abilities of veterans with disabilities. 243 A study by the Northeast ADA Center in
conjunction with the National Society of Human Resource Management and the National
Network of ADA Centers 244 found that about forty percent of employers were unaware of how to
find resources to help them accommodate the needs of veterans with disabilities. 245 More than
sixty percent indicated that it would take “more effort on the part of the employer” to
accommodate a veteran with PTSD or a Traumatic Brain Injury in the workplace. 246 The study
showed “that, though employers do have good will in this area, goodwill alone may not be
enough to ensure that workplaces are geared up to enable [veterans with disabilities] to fully
contribute their talents on the job.” 247
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The BLS survey on the employment situation of veterans also found that one-third of
veterans with service-connected disabilities work for federal, state, or local governments. 248 It is
possible that generous leave policies and other benefits available to government employees
contribute to this phenomenon as well as policies that provide veterans with preference in
hiring. 249 Factors promoting the employment of disabled veterans in the public sector should be
studied and considered for adoption in the private sector.
Overall, people with disabilities are underrepresented in the workforce. 250 A study of
veterans with disabilities by the Northeast ADA Center with collaboration from the Kessler
Foundation, Tip of the Arrow Foundation, and SM Clark, U.S. Army, found that nearly half of
respondents indicated that they believed “that their disability would prevent them from obtaining
many jobs.” 251 Fewer than one-third felt that they would be able to “advocate for themselves as a
person with a disability in the workplace.” 252 Fewer than half believed they could easily
communicate needed workplace accommodations to an employer. 253
In addition to societal barriers, it is unclear whether the VA is prepared to fully support a
work requirement for disability compensation. Would work requirements only apply to certain
veterans? Those below a certain level of disability? Those below a certain age? Those in areas
with good job markets? Would any job satisfy the requirement? Any number of hours? The
number of questions that would need to be resolved is substantial.
The need to find employment would likely place additional burdens on the VA’s Vocational
Rehabilitation and Employment program. The VA already struggles to keep caseloads within
reasonable bounds, even with only 125,000 participants. Recently, the VA hired a sufficient
number of additional vocational rehabilitation counselors to meet the needs of veterans seeking
assistance. 254 With millions of veterans of working age receiving disability compensation, 255 the
impact on the VA’s service system would likely be significant.
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In a study focused on the employment outcomes of veterans with PTSD in the VA’s
Compensated Work Therapy (CWT) program, 256 researchers found that “veterans with PTSD
were nineteen percent less likely to be competitively employed at discharge from CWT.” 257
Also, “of those who worked in their last ninety days of CWT participation, veterans with PTSD
worked fewer days compared to individuals without PTSD.” 258 Some of the reasons offered for
lower employment rates for these veterans were that they saw no future for themselves or that
there were not enough workplaces able to meet their needs. 259 They may also choose to remain
in environments in which they have more control over the situations to which they are exposed
than if they were employed. 260 Researchers concluded that the CWT program may need to
provide services focused on the unique needs of veterans with PTSD to help them secure
employment. 261
VIII.

COMPELLING WORK FOR BENEFITS IS NOT THE ANSWER

Some states have tried to implement work requirements for Medicaid recipients. 262
Supporters of these mandates think they will prompt the unemployed to get work to maintain
benefits. 263 Opponents are concerned that work requirements are a specious means of getting
Medicaid recipients off the rolls. 264
As of August 2019, Arkansas, Kentucky, New Hampshire, and Indiana received waivers
from the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services that allow them to implement work
requirements. 265 Other states are seeking similar waivers. 266 All waivers (except Indiana’s) have
been set aside pending litigation. 267
256
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Work requirements were a part of welfare reform in the 1990s 268 but failed to improve the
employment situation of recipients. 269 They also failed to change poverty rates and were not cost
effective. 270
Based on the failure of welfare to work initiatives to improve labor force participation among
recipients, such requirements in the Medicaid program may also prove to be ineffective. 271 Work
requirements for Medicaid would be costly due to the need to track whether recipients are
working or looking for work and to determine who is exempt from requirements. 272 As
previously noted, work requirements for veterans would put similar administrative burdens on
the VA.
There are concerns about the impact on those who need Medicaid benefits but would lose
them due to noncompliance with work requirements for whatever reason, 273 especially since the
requirements would likely result in “little or no long-term gain in employment.” 274 Individuals
who have mental illness or substance use disorders may face special challenges in keeping access
to Medicaid in light of work requirements. 275 Although those deemed medically frail are exempt
from the requirements, only half of Medicaid recipients have that designation. 276 Some clinicians
are concerned that many who have mental illnesses and substance use disorders will likely lose
their Medicaid benefits, 277 even though access to health care improves the opportunity for
workforce participation. 278
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If work requirements were implemented for disability compensation benefits, veterans would
likely face similar compliance issues. It is unclear how the VA would decide which veterans
would be excused from work requirements and how an individual would appeal any such
determinations. 279 Work requirements could also create conflicts with other benefits programs,
including Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI).
There might be short-term gains in employment as a result of work requirements, but those
gains have failed to continue over time when tried elsewhere. 280 Non-mandatory programs that
provide employment opportunities, however, “can increase earnings and employment without
worsening the situations of people who have significant barriers to employment and driving them
deeper into poverty.” 281 Providing better opportunities to access employment services through
VA’s Vocational Rehabilitation & Employment program and other initiatives on a voluntary
basis may result in improved workforce participation. 282
IX.

IF MANDATES ARE NOT THE ANSWER, HOW CAN VETERANS BE ENCOURAGED TO
SEEK MEDICAL TREATMENT AND PARTICIPATE IN THE WORKFORCE?

Housing First is a program that provides housing to the homeless without requiring
adherence to medication protocols or abstinence from drug abuse. 283 Those needing housing
have access to other social supports and services without being compelled to use them. 284 The
model is premised on the belief that giving clients a choice will make them “more successful in
remaining housed and improving their life.” 285 A Canadian program showed that providing
homeless persons with serious mental illness access to housing led to greater adherence to
antipsychotic medication versus those who received traditional services. 286
Although using services such as drug treatment programs is not a requirement for housing, an
important aspect of Housing First is ensuring that individuals have opportunities to receive such
services. 287 The model focuses on harm reduction to “confront and mitigate the harms of drug
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and alcohol use through non-judgmental communication.” 288 It includes motivational
interviewing which can help individuals “acquire and utilize new skills and information.” 289 The
model does not ignore improvement in an individual’s health. Instead, access to housing meets
an important need and fosters conditions that can lead to adherence to medications and
acceptance of services. 290
As demonstrated by the increased adherence to medication in the Housing First model,
veterans with service-connected disabilities should continue to receive monetary compensation
and health care without conditions. Disability compensation allows many veterans to take care of
their families and replace lost income. Access to health care can be equally important, especially
for veterans previously unable to get quality, effective health care.
More should be done to improve veterans’ access to the services and supports available to
them for service-related disabilities. Instead of requiring veterans to seek medical care, the VA
should make access to services more convenient, and include child care services 291 and expanded
appointment times that include nights and weekends. 292 The VA has a pilot child care program 293
and legislation has been introduced to make it permanent. 294
Congress has also increased access to care in local medical facilities to supplement care
available at VA facilities. The VA MISSION Act of 2018 established the Veterans Community
Care Program 295 so that veterans far from VA facilities or facing long wait times for care can go
to a provider closer to their home. 296 This may increase their participation in care and improve
their health.
Expansion of services, such as telehealth, which allow veterans and providers to connect by
video will further improve opportunities for veterans to receive the care they need. The VA is
promoting the use of telehealth to reach veterans who may have difficulty getting to

288

Id.
Id.
290
NAT’L ALLIANCE TO END HOMELESSNESS, supra note 285, at 1.
291
Press Release, Brownley Testifies on Veterans’ Access to Child Care Act Before Rules Committee, REP.
JULIA BROWNLEY (D-CA) (Feb. 6, 2019), https://juliabrownley.house.gov/brownley-testifies-on-veterans-access-tochild-care-act-before-rules-committee/ (stating that “VA research has shown that the lack of access to child care is a
barrier to receiving VA healthcare for many of our veterans.”).
292
Anita D. Misra-Hebert, MD, MPH et al., Understanding the Health Needs and Barriers to Seeking
Health Care of Veteran Students in the Community, U.S. DEP’T OF HUMAN & HEALTH SERVS. 1, 5 (Aug. 6, 2001),
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4544768/pdf/nihms-704166.pdf.
293
Caregivers and Veterans Omnibus Health Services Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-163, § 205, 124 Stat.
1130.
294
Veterans’ Access to Child Care Act, H.R. 840, 116th Cong. (2019).
295
VA MISSION Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-182, § 101, 132 Stat. 1393.
296
Id.; FACT SHEET, U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFF., VETERANS COMMUNITY CARE—GENERAL
INFORMATION, VA MISSION ACT OF 2018 (Mar. 2019),
https://www.va.gov/COMMUNITYCARE/docs/pubfiles/factsheets/VHA-FS_MISSION-Act.pdf.
289

181

appointments. 297 Telehealth is also being used to promote wellness, including access to therapies
and treatments that help veterans maintain function and improve their overall well-being. 298 As
ways to reach veterans in need expand, the VA has to evaluate these efforts to determine their
success or failure.
Fostering an environment in which veterans are supported and encouraged—but not
compelled—to receive treatment and to adhere to treatment protocols will improve veterans’
health. The VA’s goal should be improving care, not cutting costs. Getting access to the services
and supports available to them will help disabled veterans reach their full potential.
CONCLUSION
Veterans stand at the intersection of the nation’s fiscal constraints and the need to fulfill
promises to those who served. As set forth in this article, the VA disability system was designed
to fulfill the promises this nation made to those who have served, continue to serve, and will
serve in the future. In a time of unending conflict that has resulted in increased costs to care for
veterans, the system has become a potential target for reducing budget outlays. Many legislative
and policy proposals have been set forth over the past several years in an attempt to find ways to
make the system less expensive, including requiring veterans to attempt to improve their
conditions and reenter the workforce.
These proposals are of questionable legality and even more questionable practicality. They
may, in fact, have the opposite of the intended effect and alienate veterans from their health care
providers because of the potential for creating an adversarial relationship. Further, requiring
treatment or employment in exchange for benefits has had no proven efficacy when it was
attempted in other government benefit contexts. Moreover, some of the assumptions underlying
these proposals are contradicted by the research discussed in this article which shows that many
disabled veterans actually do work, even when they receive disability compensation. It also
demonstrates that workforce participation for those who do not work would not be significantly
altered if such changes were made.
Reducing barriers to benefits would do more to improve veterans’ health and long-term
recovery than conditioning benefits on medical treatment or employment. Veterans deserve to
exercise their free will in pursuing their life goals just as every other American, and to not be
treated as burdens to the federal budget. For the reasons set forth in this article, proposals to
condition the receipt of veterans’ benefits on employment or forced acceptance of medical
treatment are unwise legally and practically.
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